Since gaining independence in 1960, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has been subject to widespread violence. Along with being one of the largest countries in Africa, the DRC’s vast natural resources and central position on the continent have put it frequently at the centre of both civil and interstate conflict. The most recent of these is the ongoing Kivu conflict: a series of separate yet intertwined conflicts between the DRC military and various armed groups, all focused around the North and South Kivu provinces in Eastern DRC. Since the eruption of violence in 2004, the conflict has gone through several stages of temporary cessation followed by a resumption of hostilities, with different militant groups at the forefront of different stages. Additionally, the conflict has attracted the attention of a number of foreign actors, not the least of which is Rwanda, who created and maintains its support of the rebel March 23 Movement (M23).
Immediately after achieving independence from Belgium, the DRC was faced with growing secessionist movements, the United States and Belgian-backed assassination of its first prime minister Patrice Lumumba, and a subsequent coup. Lumumba had sought to unify the country and assert control over its vast natural resources, advocating for policies that prioritized Congolese sovereignty. Lumumba’s vision threatened Belgium’s economic dominance in the resource-rich Katanga province, where Belgian companies had long profited at the expense of the locals. The US, motivated by fears of Soviet expansion in Africa, saw Lumumba’s leadership as a potential opening for communist influence in the region. These factors led to covert operations culminating in Lumumba’s capture, execution, and the rise of military officer Mobutu Sese Seko, who would rule with the support of the US.
Under Mobutu, the DRC — which had its name changed to Zaire under his rule — was subject to a repressive dictatorship. In 1997, he was overthrown by a coalition of African states in the First Congo War. Far from achieving peace, barely a year later the Second Congo War broke out after the new Congolese president Laurent-Désiré Kabila turned against his former allies Rwanda and Uganda. The Second Congo War ended in a stalemate in 2003 with as many as 5.4 million deaths and the ascension of Laurent-Désiré Kabila’s son, Joseph Kabila to the presidency. This history highlights the DRC’s frequent position as a battleground nation. The Second Congo War is often referred to as ‘Africa’s World War’ because of the numerous African nations that took part in the conflict. Additionally, throughout all this time, militant groups were often armed and used by the various sides to aid their forces.
By 2004, the peace process had already started to unravel. In North Kivu, military officer Laurent Nkunda launched a rebellion against the transitional government under Kabila. Other militant groups seized the opportunity, and once again, the region was plunged into conflict. Nkunda and his National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) had risen to the forefront of the conflict until 2009 when Nkunda was arrested by his former allies in the Rwandan government, and the CNDP split into factions, with many joining the Congolese military. Low-intensity clashes continued until 2012 when a new armed group suddenly emerged to reignite conflict in the Kivu region. Created after former CNDP members launched a mutiny against the government, M23 began its rebellion and, with it, the second stage of the Kivu conflict. A United Nations report would later find that Rwanda had created and controlled the group. The rebellion lasted over one year, with M23 eventually forced into a ceasefire by the DRC’s armed forces, allied militant groups, and the UN, which had become involved in peacekeeping efforts. In 2015, violence rose once again and initiated the third and current stage in the Kivu conflict, involving numerous other rebel groups as well as Islamist militants primarily organized under the banner of the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), escalating their own insurgency in 2017.
The most recent development in the Kivu conflict began in 2022 when M23 launched a new offensive in North Kivu and seized multiple towns and villages. Both Rwanda and Uganda are alleged to have provided support to M23 in its renewed campaign, with Rwanda even being accused of actively participating in the fighting. For Rwanda, its investment in the Kivu conflict stems from security concerns and resource exploitation. The Rwandan government cites the presence of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), a Hutu power group linked to the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, as a primary justification for its actions in the DRC. Simultaneously, control over lucrative mineral resources, particularly in North Kivu, provides financial and strategic incentives for continued intervention. Uganda, similarly, is driven by both security concerns, given the cross-border operations of militant groups, and economic motives tied to resource exploitation.
The DRC, for its part, is also alleged to be providing support to the FDLR. Both states deny their involvement with these groups, yet reports have consistently confirmed each side’s allegations. The UN has continued to be involved in peacekeeping efforts through the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), yet has been met with backlash from both sides in the conflict. Rwanda for its cooperation with the DRC’s armed forces and the DRC for its perceived failure to protect civilians from armed groups. The M23 offensive remains ongoing and tensions between Rwanda and the DRC continue to soar, with fears growing of a possible wider, more direct war between the two nations.
The cause of the Kivu conflict can be difficult to pinpoint, as with other conflicts that have plagued the DRC. There is no single catalyst that serves to tie the country’s problems together. The support and backing provided to armed groups in previous conflicts, as well as the failure of the state to assert its control, has only fueled the rise of rebel militias and enabled them to establish and maintain a presence throughout the nation. This has the additional effect of making it easier for foreign governments, such as Rwanda, to assert their own control over the DRC through proxies, such as M23. The vast natural resources that lie in the Congo are also an obvious factor, attracting the attention of domestic and foreign actors to interfere for their own benefit. The DRC contains the largest reserves of metals and rare minerals in the world, accounting for as much as 70% of the globe’s cobalt supply. Cobalt alone, necessary for the lithium-ion batteries which power things like electric vehicles, offers extremely lucrative mining opportunities. Rebel groups often battle for control of these mines, using forced and child labour to fund their respective insurgencies. Additionally various countries have been eager to profit off of mines in the Congo, with Chinese and Canadian companies being the most present. These mining corporations operate with minimal accountability, resulting in massive socio-economic inequality and environmental degradation, which keeps the Congolese economy reliant on resource extraction while funnelling wealth abroad.
As with essentially all conflicts, the civilian population has been the most disproportionately affected. Since 2004, hundreds of thousands of deaths have been attributed to the Kivu conflict, with as many as 7 million people internally displaced. Armed groups frequently engage in child recruitment, mass killings, and sexual violence, with 400,000 women raped each year in the DRC. Similar allegations have been thrown at the DRC’s armed forces, albeit to a relatively lesser extent. In addition to the more blatant horrors of war, the conflict has led to the destruction of infrastructure and civil institutions and resulted in major socio-economic difficulties for the country. For its part, the MONUSCO peacekeeping mission has had limited success. Far from stabilizing the region, the situation has only seemed to grow steadily worse in recent years, with the United Nations planning to completely withdraw their forces by December 2024, despite publishing a report earlier in the year regarding the rising level of violence and fear for a wider conflict. Taking all this into account, the Kivu conflict seems more likely to escalate than abate and the potential for a full-blown war between Rwanda and the DRC only grows with each passing day.
Edited by Bill Lin
This is an article written by a Staff Writer. Catalyst is a student-led platform that fosters engagement with global issues from a learning perspective. The opinions expressed above do not necessarily reflect the views of the publication.
Alexander Morris-Schwarz is a third-year student at McGill University where he is majoring in Political Science with a minor in Communication Studies. Alexander is currently a staff writer for Catalyst and he is interested in international relations and imperialism.