On December 8, 2024, Bashar al-Assad’s 24-year-long regime collapsed, signalling a dramatic shift in Syria’s political landscape. The 53-year-rule of the Assad family in Syria had been characterized by persistent internal distress, most notably the nearly 15 years of war. The war in Syria began in March of 2011 with protests inspired by the Arab Spring, and rapidly escalated into a serious conflict fueled by the regime’s violent response. Since 2011, the Syrian population has endured an estimated death toll of 620,000, severe internal fragmentation, mass detention, and forced displacement, all of which have contributed to a globally recognized refugee crisis.
Following the demise of al-Assad’s regime, cries of joy have been heard worldwide by Syrians celebrating the fall of the authoritarian family rule. Despite these echoes of happiness, many Syrians have raised concerns about the country’s future, most commenting on the importance of inclusivity across religious and sectarian boundaries, with a significant portion of the population fearing the presence of a new leadership with a history of ties to Sunni extremism. With its diverse demographic, many Syrians from minority Muslim sects, such as the Alawites, Ismailis, and Druze, as well as Christians, have voiced their worries about their incorporation and consideration in this new regime among a majority of Sunni Muslims. These comments of concern speak to the increased divisions across religious and sectarian populations within modern-day Syria. Many narratives have continued to perpetuate a primordialist perspective on contemporary Syria, implying an inherent divide between these religions and sects and a natural trajectory toward conflict. An examination of historical patterns provides contrasting contextualization to this perspective offering a view of this heightened separation and sectarianism as a result of tactics of control. Evidence of such tactics can be found in the work of French administrators in the 20th century, and a revitalization of comparable strategies under al-Assad’s regime leading to a current state of uncertainty and tension within Syria.
Historians William L. Cleveland and Martin P. Bunton characterized the French presence in Syria after World War I by its adherence to a policy of “divide and rule.” What this entailed was a regional division of the Syrian population across sectarian and religious lines creating entrenched notions of separation. The policy of divide and rule enabled a situation wherein the Syrian population was forced to physically separate, making it increasingly difficult to create an integrated community or consolidate a national Syrian identity. This strategy favoured French control by allowing their administration to dominate the political sphere while the native population struggled to unify. The French administration also took advantage of this division by establishing strong ties to certain minority sects and religious populations, creating a system wherein minorities felt reliant on the French administration for protection from the majority Sunni population. After decades of French occupation, under which these divides of religious and sectarian tension were highlighted, the Syrian population was eventually able to gain autonomy over their region in 1946. The independence of Syria was marked by protests against external interference stating, “la Syrie est pour les Syriens” or “Syria is for the Syrians,” leaving the newly independent population to question what it is to be Syrian after persistent attempts to separate and divide the people religiously.
The tactical use of religious and sectarian divides resurfaced past French attempts at control and can be traced quite clearly into the newly disintegrated regime of al-Assad. While there has been a dominant attempt at understanding the recent war in Syria by sectarian or religious divisions, the roots of the conflict stem from basic demands from the population for political rights and economic equality. In the early days of protest, opposition to the regime was not based on sectarian or religious affiliation. Political scientist Melanie Cammett asserts that there was an initial resolution from the regime opposition to establish a secular and national Syria that would govern democratically. Despite these religiously neutral aspirations, al-Assad utilized the model of sectarian and religious divides to fuel fragmentation and weaken opposition. This was enacted primarily by framing the conflict as a fight against Sunni extremists. This strategic framing mimicked the French tactic to spark fear in minority groups and create reliance on the regime to secure their position against the majority Sunni population. Cammett describes this escalation as a “self-fulfilling prophecy,” commenting on the fact that al-Assad reportedly freed thousands of extremists from prison in the early days of protest. The regime continued to highlight radicalized religious opposition and, in doing so, averted attention away from the initial cause of protest, creating a situation wherein religious and sectarian affiliation actually became an important factor of the conflict.
While many view the removal of al-Assad as an opportunity to move past these heightened religious and sectarian divisions, members of the population are still uneasy. This uneasiness is echoed in a recent interview where a resident of Damascus describes individual calls for the killing of Shias in areas like Hama. The resident also explains how Aleppo seems to have a calmer environment due to the lack of diversity in comparison to other regions, exposing how these divides seem to be based on identity. The interviewee ends his response with a simple but heavy claim stating, “people are afraid.”
The contemporary reality of sectarian and religious divisions in Syria can certainly be addressed as a direct result of historic French control and al-Asaad’s attempt at maintaining power. This correlation has helped classify these divides primarily as a result of conflict rather than an inherent and initial reason for violent engagement. While now leaving an exhausting period of war, the population of Syria carries with it these heavy tensions when considering the reconstruction of their nation. Despite these tensions, memories of coexistence beyond religious and sectarian boundaries and the release from the shared struggle under al-Assad have created an opportunity for hope. This sentiment is manifested in a tweaked revival of the early phrase “Syria is for all Syrians,” this time working as a message not just for the removal of external interference but additionally symbolizing a movement for a united national identity beyond religious and sectarian categories.
Edited by Aimee Wang
This is an article written by a Staff Writer. Catalyst is a student-led platform that fosters engagement with global issues from a learning perspective. The opinions expressed above do not necessarily reflect the views of the publication.
Yasmine Tujjar is a third-year student at McGill University, pursuing a B.A. in History with minors in Arabic language and Political Science. Her journalistic interests are rooted in her passion for post-conflict research and cross-cultural, interfaith reconciliation.