Caught between Venezuela’s revisionist dictatorship and Guyana’s fastest-growing economy in the world, lies the Essequibo region; a resource-rich yet incredibly sparsely populated territory in South America. Recently, oil was discovered off the coast of Essequibo; as such, the importance of controlling the region means much more to not just the two latter countries themselves, but also to the entire rest of the world. This begs the question–how does Guyana plan to stay on top?
While a clash between two culturally and politically differing nations is not necessarily something new, one of this scale and configuration is rather odd. Guyana, a country of fewer than one million people, faces two-thirds of its entire territory being claimed by its neighbour Venezuela, which possesses thirty times the population yet only four times the GDP. For such a seemingly meagre force when compared with Venezuela, Guyana surprisingly punches well above its weight. However, while it is true that Guyana enjoys counterweights against its neighbour, it does not take away the threat that this same neighbour poses.
For some context, the present-day dispute between Guyana and Venezuela over Essequibo, like many other disputes around the world, is a result of European colonial powers carelessly drawing lines on maps. Indeed, ever since Venezuelan independence in 1824, the state has remained adamant that everything west of the Essequibo River is their sovereign territory; and, this has continued despite many international summits determining otherwise, the existence of Guyanese independence and subsequent administration over the region, and a lack of legitimacy other than Spanish interest in the region in the 1490s.
Nowadays, however, the dispute carries far more weight than it ever did before. In 2023, Venezuela conducted a sham “referendum” among its people to support its position in the dispute. Unsurprisingly, this vote passed and thus began the formal measures to assert their legitimacy over Essequibo as much as possible. New maps were published, and new offices were created. All in an effort by Venezuelan President Nicholas Maduro to show everyone that, yes, this territory belongs to Venezuela. This tactic of staging a sham referendum and then using it as a means to justify further action (military, administrative, etc.) comes directly from the playbook of the Russians, who are obsessed with conducting “referendums” in places they want to illegally occupy, such as in Ukraine. Once those referendums pass, the results are used to try and legitimize their actions. The situation in South America is eerily similar; notably, Venezuela is backed by Russia, China, and Iran, while Guyana is backed by the United States and the United Kingdom.
As mentioned before, Guyana administers Essequibo, which itself is a headstart compared to Venezuela, which only claims it as theirs. However, when looking at things through a military lens, it isn’t even close. The Guyana Defense Force has less than 4,000 active personnel while the Venezuelans have almost 100 times that amount. In fact, the total number of active Venezuelan military and paramilitary personnel outnumber the actual population of Essequibo at a 3-to-1 ratio. Therefore, it seems that Guyana’s only advantage lies in the fact that they are the current holder of what is at stake, but with that having been said, Guyana has also been very careful in how it has gone about developing its holdings. As the fastest-growing economy in the world, Guyana has had the chance to invest in several things, like infrastructure and welfare programs, but where those come into effect matters. In the case of Essequibo, the reality on the ground has not changed much. Only two major roads exist in the entire region, both of which are made to facilitate traffic between Guyana’s population centers and the border with Brazil. Neither go anywhere close to the border with Venezuela. Therefore, in order to get from Guyana to Venezuela, one must cross through Brazil, posing issues to the Brazilian government, as they have made it very clear that they would not tolerate any aggressive action by the Venezuelans whatsoever, having moved military forces to the region after Maduro’s sham referendum.
Furthermore, the Venezuelan military, although sizable, isn’t exactly too effective. There was even a case in 2021 when Colombian drug traffickers managed to outright defeat a Venezuelan army unit, which goes to show the state of their abilities. While Venezuela does indeed have roads close to the Guyanese border, along with having recently begun construction of new infrastructure very close by, all of their tanks, armoured vehicles, and ground forces would be useless in attempting to move into Essequibo itself. Guyana has been very strategic in that, when building roads in the region, not only have they kept them far from Venezuela, but they have also only constructed them going from north to south, whereas Venezuela would need to move from west to east. A hypothetical Venezuelan incursion’s best bet would be to use the region’s rivers, which do in fact flow from west to east. But with any incursion comes the need for logistics, which the harsh jungle environment would significantly impede. To keep an incursion within optimal supply capacity, only smaller units would be able to operate effectively within Essequibo, rendering the maintenance of control over the area very difficult. In this sense, if Guyana receives support from allies such as the US or Brazil, they could easily swoop in with a few small units of their own wherever possible, and take out under-defended Venezuelan outposts in a protracted and unwinnable guerilla campaign for the Venezuelans.
How else could the Venezuelans capture Essequibo if moving into the region would be virtually suicidal? Well, if the Guyanese government won’t give up the territory themselves, then the Venezuelans could just take them out and force them to concede. As with moving through Essequibo, getting military units from Venezuela to the Guyanese capital city of Georgetown is no easy task. The only aforementioned road route is through Brazil, which obviously wouldn’t allow access given its position, leaving the only logical route as the sea. Now, with their military capacity, the Venezuelans could potentially pull off an amphibious assault and capture Georgetown, but there are two problems with this. Firstly, there is no guarantee that Guyana will surrender after its capital is captured. They could continue fighting in other regions and still be a problem for the Venezuelans. Secondly, if Guyana receives support from abroad. If the US or UK get involved, even indirectly, the naval route for a potential amphibious assault could be immediately blocked off, and thus deemed infeasible. On top of this, as with the case, if an incursion into Essequibo is launched, allied support could give the Guyanese access to weapons and resources to fend off a Venezuelan landing attempt, making it harder for them to be able to try anything like it again.
The Venezuelan strategy on how to get their way lies in the hope that the rest of the world won’t do anything to stop them, or that Guyana is too weak to do it themselves. Yet, even if they try, the Guyanese seem to have planned for this scenario for a very long time. Guyanese defences aren’t in their numbers, they lie in the placement of their infrastructure. Their ability to predict incursion routes doesn’t come from spies, but rather from the layout of their natural geography. Even if their capital city comes under threat, the Guyanese can rest assured that its allies know that it wouldn’t take much from them at all to block the Venezuelans from having an easy victory. In short, while ridiculously outgunned and outmanned, the Guyanese know what they are up against. Planning their road network went hand in hand with planning their strategy, with their allies guarding their more vulnerable flanks. Guyana continues to grow richer, and Venezuela more revisionist, yet even with the odds not looking too good from the outside, all they have to do is watch Venezuela try their luck, and then they will fail just by giving it a go. That, if anything, is the perfect way to stop an invader. They simply use the jungle as their shield.
Edited by Alexandra MacNaughton
This is an Op-Ed article written by a Catalyst Staff Writer and does not necessarily reflect the political opinion of the platform. Catalyst is a student-led publication that encourages engagement with global issues from a learning perspective
Oliver “Ollie” Scott-Hansen is an undergraduate student at McGill University studying history and Russian language, hailing from just outside New York City, yet maintaining similarly strong ties to his familial heritage in north and central Italy. He joined the Catalyst team in Fall 2024 as a staff writer, something he enjoys doing as a hobby as well. With a particularly vested interest in Eastern Europe, the post-USSR world, and the Russo-Ukrainian war, coupled with his various connections throughout the global international relations space, Ollie reports on issues throughout the world that mostly center around key geopolitical developments in contentious places mostly involving war/conflict, and domestic affairs within the United States. He has experience mainly reporting from Telegram, carefully analyzing the Russian Invasion of Ukraine through his updates forum there, but also spends considerable amounts of his free time glued to maps and statistics trying to make sense of the crazy world that surrounds our day-to-day lives.