The Ottawa Treaty: Why the Global South Signed While Superpowers Stayed Out
Photo Credits: by Benoit Debaix, published on February 11, 2021, licensed under Unsplash. No changes were made.

The Ottawa Treaty: Why the Global South Signed While Superpowers Stayed Out

In 2023, nearly 2,000 people were killed and over 3,600 injured by anti-personnel landmines (APLs) across 53 countries—with civilians making up 84% of the victims, including hundreds of children. These staggering statistics serve as a stark reminder that, despite the Ottawa Landmine Treaty’s goal of eliminating APLs, they continue to maim and kill in conflict zones worldwide. Officially known as the Mine Ban Treaty, the Ottawa Treaty was adopted in 1997 and prohibits the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of APLs. It has been signed by over 160 countries, though key military powers like the United States, Russia, and China have not joined.

But why has a treaty signed by over 160 countries failed to eliminate this threat? The answer lies in its unconventional negotiation process, strategic bypassing of major diplomatic forums, and lack of enforcement mechanisms—all of which exposed a deep North-South power imbalance. While the Global South overwhelmingly championed the Treaty, dominant military powers such as the U.S., Russia, and China refused to sign, prioritizing strategic military interests over humanitarian concerns.

This raises two key questions: Why have Global South nations embraced the Ottawa Treaty, even while some lack the resources for full compliance? And why are middle-powers like Finland and Poland opting out in 2025?

Unlike powerful states that viewed landmines as a strategic military asset, many Global South nations have been directly affected by the humanitarian crisis APLs created. Countries like Mozambique, Angola, Cambodia, and Nicaragua have had vast swaths of land rendered unusable due to decades of war and indiscriminate landmine deployment. For these states, the Treaty isn’t about military pragmatism—it is about survival, rebuilding, and ensuring basic human security.

Additionally, the Ottawa Process deliberately bypassed traditional diplomatic forums like the United Nations, where dominant states could have obstructed negotiations. Instead, the treaty was led by middle powers like Canada, Norway, and Belgium, prioritizing speed and humanitarian urgency over enforceability.

The Global South’s alignment suggests that states follow the lead of early adopters—not necessarily due to strategic interests, but out of a desire to align with emerging international norms. Once South Africa, Mozambique, and Cambodia signed on, other Global South states felt pressured to follow suit—not because they all relied on landmines, but because refusing to sign would have signalled resistance to a global humanitarian consensus.

Indeed, for many of these countries, participation in the Treaty also came with diplomatic advantages. Signing the Treaty meant greater legitimacy in international politics, increased foreign aid for demining programs, and a chance to strengthen ties with humanitarian organizations like the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

However, the speed of the Treaty’s adoption came at a cost—its enforcement mechanisms remained weak, allowing non-signatory states to continue stockpiling and deploying APLs without consequences. For military powers like the U.S., Russia, and China, landmines were never just a humanitarian issue; they were a necessary strategic tool. The U.S. continues to stockpile over 3 million landmines, citing national security concerns—particularly its potential use in Korea. Russia has used landmines extensively in Ukraine, reinforcing defensive lines and slowing counter-offensives. China relies on landmines for border security, particularly along its contested borders with India and Myanmar.

Unlike treaties with coercive enforcement mechanisms—like the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which includes IAEA inspections and sanctions—the Ottawa Treaty has no real means of forcing compliance. Its legitimacy relies entirely on voluntary moral commitments, making it ineffective against powerful states that see APLs as a military necessity.

This lack of enforcement also explains why, in 2025, Finland and Poland will be opting out—both countries, given increasing security concerns with Russia, have reconsidered their military reliance on landmines.

Despite its flaws, the Ottawa Treaty successfully stigmatized landmine use. Today, even non-signatory states like the U.S. and China engage in de-mining efforts and have unofficially pledged to restrict landmine use—a testament to the Treaty’s soft power influence.

However, the Treaty’s core failure lies in its inability to address the structural power imbalance between military powers and humanitarian actors. Global South nations signed the Treaty out of necessity, while powerful states remained absent out of strategic interest. The Ottawa Process may have created a global norm against landmines, but without real enforcement, the world’s most militarized states continue to shape international security policy on their terms.

The Ottawa Treaty was a humanitarian achievement, but in a world where power politics still dictate global security, humanitarian norms alone are not enough to disarm the most powerful states.

Looking ahead, the future of the Ottawa Treaty—and global landmine eradication—may depend on recalibrating the balance between moral urgency and strategic pragmatism. Rather than simply accelerating bureaucratic processes, future disarmament efforts may require stronger multilateral frameworks capable of engaging, pressuring, or incentivizing powerful states to participate. Humanitarian organizations now face the challenge of lobbying not just for empathy, but for policies that align moral appeals with the strategic priorities of dominant actors.

Edited by Campbell Graham

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