A brief summary of US aid in Central and Andean South America would be the pursuit of self-interest, wrapped in outwardly humanitarian intent. Assistance began during the Kennedy administration over fears of communism taking root in impoverished Central American states, marking the beginning of the American imperative to ‘develop’ the region. Development aid budgets remained high until the end of the Cold War, following which, many regional conflicts began to wind down due to a collapse of support for left wing groups. Aid to Andean states increased in the 1990s to counter increasing drug trafficking, an issue which remains extremely prevalent along with illegal migration. Despite aid budgets continuing to climb in recent decades, their impact is up for debate.
Through a recent development package, the United States appears to be taking steps to remedy their history of chronic intervention and undermining of democracies throughout Central and South America. This year’s foreign assistance package to Latin America and the Caribbean marked the largest annual budget in over a decade, granting multi-million and billion-plus sums to governments and NGOs with great emphasis placed on local initiatives. Support in managing Covid-19 shockwaves was a key inclusion, mostly through debt restructuring and establishing payment plans to manage spiking deficits. Though appearing to shift in focus, the United States’ development aid in central and South America remains fundamentally self-interested in multiple respects. The streams receiving the greatest increases in funding are those connected to volatile domestic issues, namely curbing illegal migration and trade in narcotics. Law enforcement and security have generally been prioritized over humanitarian efforts, which remains true for the budgetary allocations of the current package.
Extensive meddling in the region has not come without consequence; the instability and economic hardship produced by US interventions have transformed into a near-constant stream of illegal migration, a complicated social issue whose solution has yet to be found in development aid ledgers. Illegal migration, though in large part a product of intervention and destabilization, is often framed to domestic audiences as the United States being an irresistible economic mecca to all those seeking a life their home country cannot provide. Liberalizing development aid is therefore a digestible solution to a complex problem and avoids larger questions of its long-term viability.
Different government reports characterize the situation differently depending on their goals. The language used in the Congressional Research Service report on development aid is steeped in Cold War-era euphemisms, which skillfully avoids any admission of guilt and implies a strong paternal responsibility to lift the region from poverty. The democratic elections of left-wing politicians are described as insurgencies, and neoliberal reforms as market diversification. The report dealing specifically with migration is more blunt; liberalization led to land consolidation, which brought deep instability and lower wages to the labour market. The consistent misdiagnosis of these issues therefore reproduces the need for development aid and policy reform.
The most recent package includes over $860 million to address the root causes of migration, the first step in a 4-year, $4 billion commitment. Migration rates can be correlated with the trending of aid endowments as large and sudden shifts in funding often trigger a rise in irregular migration. However, the impact of increased development aid is modest at best, with a 10% increase in funding correlating with a decrease in migration of less than 2%. Scholarship on the matter strongly suggests development aid alone will not solve such issues; the most effective solutions to date have been the growth of social services and reducing government corruption. There is an admission in the report that budgetary increases fail to achieve long-term goals, but it essentially amounts to a verbal shoulder shrug.
The failure of development aid to further US goals in the region prompts the question of why billions of dollars are invested annually into such a highly ineffective program. To understand this further, the domestic political implications of migration must be considered. Suppose the antiquated and tone-deaf language describing the rosy history of US involvement is a smokescreen against institutional backlash and the United States has an honest desire to redeem themselves. Even if we assume a change of heart, a basic analysis of the possible outcomes for Central America reveals that there is very little chance for real change. Migration represents a polarizing political force gaining increasing traction in national discourse with no clear-cut solutions. Corporations indirectly drive migration through economic subjugation and those most affected rally to the same political party en masse, producing a catch-22 for the current administration. Hard-line approaches championed by border states to address structural causes and produce humanitarian crises, limiting their long-term effectiveness. Given the deep economic integration within all these states, there is only so much the United States can do to solve their social issues without endangering their own interests.
To attempt to stop the issue at its source with regionally specific development programs is to acknowledge a series of much larger issues and risks angering corporate lobbies with virtually unlimited power in American politics. To do nothing risks the proliferation of dangerous right-wing rhetoric, as evidence of a recent series of high-profile political stunts. Florida Governor Ron DeSantis’s act of relocating large amounts of migrants to northeastern cities proved to have an immediate political payoff and sowed considerable division. Thus, the final option viable within political time horizons is to continue the current path of development aid; a simple solution for ideologically predisposed domestic audiences. Even if the United States is seeking to appease the domestic sphere with these aid programs, a separate and equally powerful political cohort will prevent them from going to distance.
Development aid in Central America is ultimately a means to domestic ends. There is a pattern among small third-world states adjacent to large economies, who often force them to embrace the politics of the hegemon, leading inevitably to the smaller states serving as a reserve labour force and a resource depot for the larger state. Development rarely addresses such issues, as those providing development aid are often wealthier states actively invested in the status quo. The natural resources of these states are of the utmost importance to the United States, meaning development aid will never endanger their right to continue exploiting them. Self-interest is always the deciding factor above any humanitarian or development concerns, as is true of all American foreign policy. At its core, development aid is a short-term solution to a structural problem. Though this recent report is a step in the right direction, the situation is unlikely to fundamentally change.
Edited by Isaac Yong
