On March 5, 2025, the Sudanese government accused the United Arab Emirates (UAE) before the International Court of Justice (IJC) of complicity in genocide in its relations to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary group that has allegedly committed crimes against humanity against the Masalit, an ethnic group located in Western Sudan. According to Sudan’s application, the UAE has aided RSF operations through financial, military and logistical support, enabling “killings, rape, forced displacement, and the destruction of infrastructure.” Evidence provided by international watchdog organizations has supported this accusation, but the case was dismissed in May after the court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case.
Though international organizations have failed to deliver substantive systems of accountability for the atrocious events in Sudan, and though the violence has continued since the accusation, the UAE’s impunity in its violent investment in Sudan is demonstrative of a broader post-Cold war pattern in Africa. As former colonial powers have retreated from African politics in recent decades, new emergent powers have taken their place in this sector of the global economy. But are Russia, China, and the Gulf petrostates truly more benevolent of trade partners than their predecessors? The UAE’s interference in Sudan’s conflicts suggests otherwise.
Sudan’s Gold Mines as Fuel for the Crisis
The devastating civil war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the RSF, which originates from competition among military elites for national revenue, is sustained by Sudan’s artisanal and small-scale gold mining (ASGM) industry. The illicit, multi-billion-dollar trade has entrenched militia governance, encouraged foreign intervention, and helped transform Sudan into a fragmented shadow state vulnerable to predatory economic powers. As Marc Ummel, a researcher on African gold, said, “To solve the war in Sudan, we have to follow the gold, and we arrive at the UAE.”
The UAE has officially denied any allegations of smuggling and profiteering from gold during the humanitarian crisis. However, according to Sudanese officials and mining industry sources, nearly all of Sudan’s gold revenues pass through UAE channels by both official and illicit routes in South Sudan, Chad, Egypt, and the Central African Republic. The country’s most productive industrial mine is owned by an Emirati company, and according to Taher, 90 percent of Sudan’s legal exports are bought by the UAE. This reveals a mutually beneficial relationship in the short-term between the Sudanese government, which receives funds to buttress the war effort and the luxury market in the UAE.
The alleged perpetrator of ethnically-targeted violence, the RSF, is led by commander Mohamed Hamdan Daglo, who has long controlled gold mines to establish a private mercenary group and finance weaponry. In this regard, the UAE also seems implicated: armoured vehicles, guided bombs, small arms, and military information technology manufactured in the UAE have been found on Sudanese battlefields, which violates the U.N. arms embargo. Several of these weapons have been found in RSF control, and evidence has been found of the presence of Emirati personnel in Sudan.
According to U.N. reports, more than three thousand civilians were killed in the conflict, and there are reports of RSF carrying out ethnically-targeted “summary executions” in North Darfur and North Kordofan against non-Arab ethnic groups. Amnesty International reports that sexual violence and rape have been used to “humiliate, assert control, and displace communities”, and the RSF has sieged El Fasher to limit food and medical supply delivery to effect starvation tactics. Brutality continues even after international condemnation of targeted violence, as the United States declared that the RSF committed genocide in Darfur in January, citing “systematic atrocities” against specific ethnic groups.
The Relationship between Vulnerable Statehood and International Profiteering
The urgency of the Sudanese case draws attention to a greater problem in African statehood, wherein fragile states weakened by colonial legacies and extractive modes of revenue remain vulnerable to foreign intervention. The colonial and post-independence model of superpower competition has eroded, leaving a multipolar scramble for profit.
Russia, in particular, has emerged as an interventionary force, especially through private military companies like the Wagner Group, which offers security support in exchange for resource extraction and geopolitical concessions. Wagner has been linked to both sides of the Sudanese conflict, but is also embedded in the security apparatus of the Central African Republic, in Libya, Mali, and elsewhere in the Sahel.
Economically, China takes the forefront of foreign powers and has surpassed the U.S. and EU as Africa’s largest trade partner, buying raw goods and selling manufactured products back into the market. Though this has led to significant infrastructure investment (railways, ports, and transportation), the use of Chinese labour and contractors has continued to circulate profit towards the world power, and as its lender has perpetuated a deep debt dependency. Debate endures about whether China has an emancipatory agenda, whereby its investment fosters a positive trade climate for Africa, or if it remains a neocolonial force that perpetuates resource dependency.
Trade is essential to prosperity in Africa, and non-Western powers often seem like beneficial alternatives to former colonial powers. Among them, China in particular follows a development-based, non-interference approach that appears less interventionist. Modern African leaders, like Burkina Faso’s Ibrahim Traore, gain legitimacy by promoting a vision of the country that doesn’t rely on trade and aid from colonial powers. But the dangers of these associations remain salient. Environmental factors are an essential factor to consider, as mining and resource extraction have led to deforestation, toxic waste contamination, and pollution in many areas.
Change and Continuity in Colonialism
It is rare for foreign aid and trade in Africa to be delivered without stipulations, as economic influence almost immediately translates into political leverage. State sovereignty is imperative for continental progress; however, profits from national resources should not be drained for foreign profits. The case of Sudan exemplifies how modern intervention without accountability fuels suffering.
In the context of a weak system of international accountability, it remains to be found how a new paradigm of progress can be developed. While stronger oversight over international actors and transparent arms control are essential to promoting safety in vulnerable communities, it is also important to consider the origins of state fragility and ethnic conflict so that community sovereignty and civil society strength can be restored.
Edited by Gabriela Flaschberger
Disclaimer: This is an article written by a Staff Writer. Catalyst is a student-led platform that fosters engagement with global issues from a learning perspective. The opinions expressed above do not necessarily reflect the views of the publication.
Noé Beaudoin is a second year student at McGill majoring in International Development Studies and Economics and minoring in English. As a writer for Catalyst, she seeks to explore the interaction between current events abroad and cultural discourse and is particularly interested in the Middle East and climate action.