Photo Credits: “PTI protests in favor of Imran Khan” by Voice of America, Published April 11 2022. Licensed under Wikimedia Commons. No changes were made.
2024 is a critical year globally with many large and influential democracies holding crucial elections with hopes to finalize and mobilize a hopeful political vision. Pakistan had an election scheduled for February 8th, 2024, however, its results have left the political future of Pakistan more uncertain than hopeful and reassured. Populist figure and the winner of the previous election, Imran Khan, won with a total of 99 seats, all of which ran under the independent label due to his former party, Pakistan Tehreek Insaaf (PTI), having been barred from running. However, Khan did not reach the required majority of 169 seats, and neither did the other two major opposition parties, Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PMLN) (71 seats) and Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) (53 seats), even when combining both opposition party seats. Therefore, the election outcome left Pakistan’s future government uncertain and has also raised major legitimacy concerns among the populace and international spectators, who have speculated that rigging was prevalent.
Imran Khan was arrested in August of last year on charges of corruption as well as the invalidity of his marriage in Islamic law, a charge even his critics considered superficial. This prompted preemptive distrust among the electorate regarding the legitimacy of these elections. Khan’s criminal charges were widely speculated to be politically motivated, an action to keep him from directly contesting the election. As such, following Khan’s arrest, he and his party were banned from contesting the elections directly, marking an uncertain future for Pakistan. This was further complicated by the popular support Khan holds in Pakistan. Around 85 corruption cases have been filed against Khan since he vocally raised criticism against the Pakistani military establishment and other prominent figures in the Pakistani government, following his removal as prime minister in a no-confidence vote in 2022. Khan is not the first leader to oppose the military establishment and reap the consequences. The military has historically played an overarching role in ensuring the affairs of the civilian elected government remain in line with their initiatives. For example, in the 1999 coup d’etat, the military establishment was able to completely dissolve and replace Nawaz Sharif’s elected government with General Pervez Musharaf’s military government.
Khan and his wife, Bibi Bushra, were sentenced to 14 years in prison on charges of corruption and leaking of national secrets just weeks before the election. Notably, in the 2018 election, the then head of PMLN party, Nawaz Sharif, was also arrested prior to the election on corruption charges, indicating Khan’s arrest is not an isolated case of candidates being suppressed prior to an election. In extreme circumstances, major popular candidates have mysteriously and suddenly been assassinated, as was the case with Benazir Bhutto, the first female prime minister of Pakistan from the PPP party who was shot in an election rally just months before the controversial 2008 elections. Such circumstances prior to election time raise rightful legitimacy concerns behind the electoral process, as such convictions and assassinations are never transparently accounted for, always leaving behind more questions than concrete answers.
In the case of Khan, despite being barred from running, he was able to mobilize a large-scale voting effort under an independent title to win the most number of seats out of all parties. However, that is not enough to secure the certainty of his party, let alone the prime ministerial position. Khan’s populist and self-centered approach to governance has effectively left him isolated among other Pakistani political parties, especially in the final months of his premiership. His inability to find common ground with other parties in order to form a majority coalition has rendered him isolated outside of his hyper-partisan support base. Khan ran in 2018 on promises to increase international foreign investment from overseas Pakistanis, to strengthen the nation’s economy and hold corrupt politicians accountable for draining Pakistan of its economic potential. However, his tenure demonstrated he was ineffective in his economic policy, whereupon inflation of flour and sugar prices under his government rose even prior to the pandemic. Before his term as prime minister, Khan was critical of Pakistan’s persistent borrowing from the IMF and World Bank and promised to not increase their debt with IMF loans. Yet Khan went back on that promise once he won in 2018, when he decided to once again acquire another IMF loan for Pakistan. Prior to the election, Khan renewed blame towards the corrupt politicians, such as the Sharif and Bhutto families, for both Pakistan’s declining socio-economic situation and political suppression. But this time, he also placed blame upon the military establishment, a hypocritical stance in light of his reciprocal support from the military throughout his premiership.
The military establishment in Pakistan has a monopoly on foreign policy and the affairs of any elected civilian government, including large influence over who is elected prime minister. Since Pakistan’s creation in 1947, the military has always retained predominant control over the civilian government and has even overthrown elected leaders. Khan’s popularity in the recent elections was galvanized further by the increased anti-military sentiment, which arguably mobilized voters to vote independent over the opposition parties. Such opposition parties have closely re-aligned with the military, after the military’s abrupt departure from favouring Khan as prime minister in April 2021. The integrity of the election process such as the alleged rigging of various seats has been questioned both externally and historically, as the predominant influence of the military establishment hampers the transparency and integrity of the democratic processes in the country. As a result of the military’s constantly evolving preference for the various political parties in Pakistan as well as sustained deficiencies in Pakistan’s democracy and security situation, there has never been a prime minister that has successfully served their elected term. The lack of political continuity and restrictions on elected governments has naturally diminished the confidence among Pakistanis, particularly the youth, in their democratic system.
Almost three weeks after the uncertain election outcome, the PPP and PMLN parties created a coalition government through collaborating with other small parties to form a unified governance platform. This gives way for the brother of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, Shehbaz Sharif of the PMLN party, to take the reins of power as prime minister and the return of the former President of Pakistan, Asif Ali Zardari from the PPP. The coalition government has announced its mission to usher in economic reform and help curb the current currency and inflation crisis in Pakistan. Such a task is easier said than done, as the coalition government faces long-term economic challenges that continue to burden the Pakistan economy with debt, and continued challenges in maintaining a cohesive and stable government. Furthermore, the legitimacy of the elected government is called into question by many Pakistanis, specifically those who backed Khan, who are concerned over what they perceive as the lack of action by the military against alleged discrepancies in the vote count, which only adds to the anti-military sentiment. There are also nepotist concerns over the lack of fresh new faces in Pakistani government following Zardari’s return to politics. Due to Khan’s imprisonment, there also exist logistical challenges for his new caucus to govern, including pressures towards independent candidates from the military to switch parties, lack of non-partisan political consensus, and the missing key to the whole party’s operations and appeal: Khan himself.
Edited by Willa Morrison
Waleed is a fourth-year Political Science and History student. Being a Pakistani who was born and raised in Saudi Arabia, his third-culture upbringing lends itself to where his areas of interest lie: international relations and politics in the Middle East and South Asia, with a specific interest in imperialism in the Global South.