Human beings are inescapably, inherently, and unfortunately irrational beings. At least, this is the view Daniel Kahneman posited in his revolutionary novel, Thinking, Fast and Slow, which discusses the inherent cognitive biases that govern our decision-making and worldviews – one which is generally accepted worldwide. Subconsciously governed by biases that stretch into every facet of our lives, human beings are continually trying to prioritize rationalism to avoid being carelessly led. Identifying the psychological underpinnings of our behaviour as both policymakers and followers, allows us to break down and accordingly correct these pre-existing cognitive structures.
Yet, what if these cognitive biases were our hidden superpowers? This is the theory Professor Dominic Johnson presents in his groundbreaking novel, Strategic Instincts: The Adaptive Advantages of Cognitive Biases in International Politics. Johnson challenges Kahneman’s popular belief that cognitive biases contribute to political disaster by arguing from an evolutionary standpoint that such biases instead serve an objective, desirable purpose which has contributed to political success. A more nuanced exploration of the interplay between cognitive psychology and political affairs reveals the detrimental and unsuspectingly triumphant dimensions of cognitive biases within war, recession, and appeasement. Historically, Johnson contests that these biases served a real purpose, and perhaps they still do.
From a psychological standpoint, cognitive biases are defined as ‘systematic cognitive dispositions or inclinations in human thinking and reasoning that often do not comply with the tenets of logic, probability reasoning, and plausibility.’ These subconscious ‘mental shortcuts’ lay the basis of human decision-making and arise typically from using cognitive heuristics. Research reveals the existence of up to twenty kinds of cognitive biases; their applications, such as optimism and overconfidence, in both negative and positive settings, will be discussed.
Philosopher Bertrand Rusell once claimed: ‘It has been said that man is a rational animal. All my life, I have been searching for evidence which could support this.’ There exists a widespread belief across the social sciences that rationality is the standard ideal we can never achieve in light of our irrational tendencies. A Google search containing the words ‘cognitive bias’ tends to yield results which portray cognitive biases, as ‘liabilities of the human brain that must be guarded against if we are to avoid costly misjudgments, misperceptions, mistakes, crises, policy failures, disasters, and wars.’ The U.K’s Institute for Government recently published a paper on how governments may ‘tackle biases in decision making.’ At the same time, the World Economic Forum highlights how our cognitive biases hinder our ability as citizens to make informed political decisions.
Johnson notes that the 2008 Financial Crisis has been closely examined by cognitive scientists to be deeply fueled by the optimism and herd mentality bias. Risky bargains, fueled by optimistic pursuits, were core contributors to the recession, according to cognitive scientist Tali Sharot, as several large financial institutions and investors had unrealistic expectations of economic growth, eventually resulting in housing inflation and an eventual crash. Furthermore, the naive belief that mortgage-backed securities were safe investments caused many to adhere to the herd mentality bias absentmindedly. Individuals did not diversify investments but put all their eggs in one basket. The recession remains richly studied by economists as an instructive model of the dangers that arise when human behaviour deviates from rationality.
In light of the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine, Eric Haseltine of Psychology Today discusses the cognitive biases which underlie why many Ukrainians were surprised at the invasion when countries an ocean away could predict it. The ‘normalcy bias’ is what Haseltine coins to have been hardwired into a majority of Ukrainians before the invasion and is one which is especially prone to individuals living in crisis. Psychologically defined as the unconscious attribution of new events to ‘normal causes’, the normalcy bias results in the presupposition that the future will remain normal. In light of Ukranians, the normalcy bias behaves as a convenient way for many to attribute certain stimuli to the most ‘normal’ or straightforward reason. For example, when hearing a loud ‘boom!’ humans tend to attribute it to natural phenomena like thunder rather than an explosion to protect us from the ‘embarrassment’ of ducking for shelter.
Here, Dominic Johnson enters the picture to reframe how psychologists have studied cognitive biases in relation to international politics and decision-making. By laying out his central premise, Johnson explains that he is not defending harmful instances of cognitive biases, but explains how they may be viewed as adaptive heuristics which evolved to improve our decision-making. Bridging the gap between social science and politics, Johnson believes that ‘the interpretation of cognitive biases as mistakes may be only natural for fields without a grounding in life sciences, but in international relations, it appears to be exacerbated by two additional tendencies: focusing on disasters and looking at isolated events.’ By taking a step back to look at a more diverse range of results and events over time, an alternate image of cognitive biases emerges.
Overconfidence Bias – The Revolutionary War
Did George Washington’s overconfidence win America the Revolutionary War? Johnson paints a persevering and courageous image of General George Washington, arguing that his confidence bias ultimately led America to victory against the world’s leading economic and military power. Described as ‘overconfident to the point of arrogance,’ Johnson attributes the successful insurgency to his leadership. While other writers have noted the British overconfidence to be the cause of their ultimate loss, Johnson carefully identifies a key difference between the two countries: Britain was often dismissive of the American threat, resulting in their failure to push forward to annihilate the insurgency when they could. When overconfidence behaves as an advantageous tool, it increases ambition deterrence and lifts morale. Perhaps fortune does favour the bold.
The Fundamental Attribution Error – The Appeasement of Hitler in World War II
Remarked by journalist Robert Wright as ‘the most under-appreciated cognitive bias,’ Johnson approaches the Fundamental Attribution Error’s (FAE) application to history in a particularly unique manner. It is defined as the tendency to explain other people’s behaviour based on their character or internal dispositions rather than the circumstances which may better explain their actions. Prior to World War II, Johnson conversely argues that the absence of the FAE led to Britain’s appeasement of Hitler and the disastrous Munich Crisis. Despite warnings of Hitler’s ulterior motives, Prime Minister Chamberlain believed his intentions to be circumstantial: the German desire to correct the damages done by the Treaty of Versailles. Johnson argues that if, instead, the FAE was instilled deeper and more widespread amongst Western diplomats at the time, perhaps Britain could have stood up to him earlier and diminished the scale of atrocities Hitler would later cause.
In-group/out-group bias – Pacific Campaign of World War II
Perhaps one of the most powerful biases humans have practiced throughout history is the ingroup-outgroup bias, otherwise known as ‘ingroup favoritism.’ Ubiquitous and timely, ingroup favoritism has rightfully earned a negative reputation throughout history as it has led to the oppression of minority groups, violence and war. Looking back to the Pacific Campaign of World War II, Johnson claims that ingroup favoritism can be a strategic instinct when applied to the appropriate setting and in small doses. During The Pacific War between the U.S. and Japan, what allowed the U.S. to withstand and ultimately prevail in their exhausting campaign against Japan was the American ingroup favoritism to help support the war effort. By increasing cohesion and motivating competition, America’s success is attributed to their ability to work together to combat an enemy, which, as journalist Daniel Blumstein notes, ‘took outgroup animosity to extreme levels.’ As General George Patton succinctly said: ‘The object of war is not to die for your country but to make the other bastard die for his.’
Can our mental shortcuts really alter the trajectory of global politics? There is a silver lining to the existence of cognitive biases in historical and contemporary politics which require us to look beyond ingrained beliefs about our brain’s unreliable nature. Refashioning Kahneman’s conventional view, Daniel Johnson presents them as strategic adaptations that have evolved to enhance decision-making in specific contexts. Johnson argues with caution, and acknowledges the extremities of our biases, “that is, when overconfidence becomes hubris, when attribution errors manifests into paranoia, and when ingroup favouritism fuels discrimination and racism.” Understanding cognitive biases as evolutionary tools opens an unassuming door to the possibilities that unveil when our flaws fuel progress.
Edited by Lucy de Cartier
Megan Tan is in her third year at McGill University, currently pursuing a BA&Sc in Cognitive Science with a minor in Philosophy. As a Staff Writer at Catalyst Publications, Megan aims to bridge her background in Behavioural Science with International Development as her writing is mainly focused on the Health and Technological dimensions of global political issues. Having grown up in Singapore, Qatar, and Canada, Megan strives to use her diverse upbringing to offer a multifaceted lens through which she examines the interplay of technology, health, and cognitive science.